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INSURANCE FEATURES OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAWSt
ARTHUR LENHOFF
I. Ipso-Jure INSURANCE AND OBLIGATION TO INSURE
A. Ipso-jure Insurance
However much diversity in details' the state statutes which create com-
pulsory insurance by means of the employer insuring the risk show, the
statutes can be grouped in two principal classes, for each of which one state
act, namely Washington 2 and New York,3 may be submitted as fairly repre-
sentative of the archetype. The New York compensation law differs from
that of Washington in one essential point: By the Washington statute the
employee is ipso-jure insured upon his entering the service, while by New
York law an insurance relationship cannot arise until the employer takes out
compensation insurance with the state fund or an insurance company, 4 except
in the exceptional case where he is allowed the status of a self-insurer. Con-
sequently, the problems discussed in this paper, although dealing primarily
with New York law, are those of all jurisdictions concerned.
In Washington, the employee is insured by the monopolistic state insurance
fund, irrespective of the failure of his employer to pay his premiums or
tThis is the first of two installments under this heading. The second part of Professor
Lenhoff's article will appear in the March issue of the COiELL LAW QUARTERLY. [Ed.1
*Where no other reference is made, the provisions of the NEw YORK WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAW (cited as W.C.L.) are referred to.
IFor the legislative-historical reasons for that diversity, see DODD, ADMINISTRATION
OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1936) 27-37; HOBBS, W0RKMEN'S COMPENSATION
INSURANCE (1939) 70-96.2WASHINGTON INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE AcT (1911), WASH. RPv. STAT. ANN. (Rem-
ington, 1932) §§ 7673 et seq., amended L. of 1939, c. 135, and L. of 1941, c. 209. The
compulsory system created in Washington has been followed in Wyoming, North
Dakota, and Ohio. The acts in Oregon and West Virginia, also based upon a monopo-
listic state fund system, are elective.
3W. C. L. of the same type as New York are, on the one hand, the FEDERAL LONG-
SHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR WoRKERs' COMPENSATION AcT [53 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45
U. S. C. 51 (1940)] and, on the other hand, the compensation acts of Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, Montana, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin.
As for this paper, the statutes of those states which base coverage upon the presumption
that in absence of notice given within a prescribed time coverage has been elected, are
considered elective and not compulsory. The same holds true of those states by whose
statutes compulsory insurance has been provided for only as to publia employment. See
Steve, The Application of State Workmenws Compensation Law to Public Employees
and Officers (1932) 17 MINN. L. REv. 162.4 Wherever compensatioT insurance rests upon an insurance contract, the insurance
company which paid compensation through an error, no policy having yet been written,
is ,deemed only to have volunteered so that no recovery can be had from the employer.
See Hardware Mutual Cas. Co. v. Lieberman, 39 F. Supp. 243 (D. N. J. 1941).
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even to undertake the steps required in order to determine the-class of -the
employment, a fact determinative of the amount of premiums to be paid.
Such failure would give the employee, it is true, a right of choice between
the insurance claim and a common-law claim for full damages.5 Such a
choice, however, is then a choice between two obligees, while in New York
failure of the employer to insure the compensation risk results in the choice
given the employee only between two remedies directed against the same
obligee, the employer. In other words, ih Washington by mere operation
of law an insurance status is secured for the employee, this status coming
into existence independent of the employer's compliance with his statutory
duties. The rise of that status and that compliance are not conditioned
concurrently.6 As a corollary, once the employer's liability for the payment
of premiums has been established, his freedom from any liability for work-
men's claims for damages results as a matter of law in the same manner as
the coverage of the employee. 7 Consequently, in case the employer's busi-
ness falls within an insured class, a plaintiff suing the employer for damages
for injuries which were suffered in the course of such employment is bound
to plead the facts which exempt the case from the scope of the statute.8 Even
a default of the employer in payment of any premiums does not necessarily
bar an insurance claim,0 for, as we saw, the employee could insist on com-
pensation in administrative proceedings.10
B. Obligation to Insure
Now, let us turn to New York. There the statute imposes upon the em-
ployer the obligation to insure the compensation risk. As long, however, as
5Contributory negligence, assumption of risk, or fellow-employee's want of due care
are not available as defenses to the employer in these proceedings. WASH. REv. STAT.
ANN. (Remington, 1932) § 7676 (11).6By payment of the compensation, the state fund is subrogated to the employee's
claim against the employer. Id. at §§ 7673, 7676 (11). See Calvin v. West Coast,
44 F. Supp. 783, 785 (D. Ore. 1942); Samarzich v. Aetna Life Ins., 180 Wash. 379,
383. 40 P. (2d) 129, 130 (1935).7Zahler v. Dep't of Labor, 125 Wash. 410, 217 Pac. 55 (1923). It is noteworthy that
the pioneers and models of compensation insurance through the state, the Austrian
and German acts, imposed the obligation to reimburse the state fund upon the em-
ployer, whether or not he had paid contributions, in case of his causing the injury by
premeditation or by gross negligence (by German law, by criminal negligence). See
A. MENZEL, DiE ARBEITERVERSICHERUNG (Leipzig, 1893) 336.
sSee Perry v. Berverage, 121 Wash. 652, 209 Pac. 1102 (1922), overruling Acres v.
Frederick & Nelson, 79 Wash. 402, 140 Pac. 370 (1914).
9Gowey v. Seattle Light, 108 Wash. 479, 184 Pac. 339 (1919); Freyman v. Day,
108 Wash. 71, 182 Pac. 940 (1919). There still remains, of course, the state's claim
for the arrears in premium and for penalties. See WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington,
1932) § 7682.
'Old. at § 7676.
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that obligation has not yet been complied with, thus leaving the employee
without any insurance coverage, he or his dependents can, upon the occur-
rence of a compensable accident, choose only between the claim for com-
pensation in administrative proceedings on the one side and the common
law action for damages before the courts on the other, either one of which
must be directed against the employer alone. Electing the latter remedy, the
claimant is required to prove the employer's negligence." What he does
not have to show is the absence of contributory negligence.' 2 That means
that the end aimed at is the compensation insurance, yet its attainment is
placed in the hands of the employer, in the event 'of whose reluctance to
insure the law provides for indirect means of enforcement only.'3 That this
obligation is considered by statute as absolute, one can see from the fact
that the failure to perform entails severe sanctions imposed upon the delin-
quent employer irrespective of the excusability of his failure.
4
. This indirect method of enforcing an absolute liability is the only alterna-
tive left to a legislature which in setting up a compulsory compensation in-
surance system balked at founding it upon the monopolistic state fund.
Unless he is willing to carry so heavy a burden as that incident to the failure
to take insurance, the employer is expected to live up to the statutory com-
mand. And if the employer, self-confident of his ability to avoid any accidents
due to negligence, failed to insure, that would not help him as the employee
"1Clark v. Brown, 206 App. Div. 568, 202 N. Y. Supp. 277 (3d Dep't 1923). Cf. Eker
Iv. Pettibone, 110 Fed. (2d) 451 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) ; Schein v. Feder, 154 Misc. 830,
278 N. Y. Supp. 653 (City Ct. 1935).
'
2The three commoq-law defenses are excluded. W. C. L. § 11. As a result of the
comparative-negligence feature of the FEn. EmI'. LIABILITY AcT, 35 STAT. 66 (1908),
,as amended, 53 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U. S. C; 54 (1940), these defenses are practically
no longer good in common-law actions brought under this Act as well.
13 Failure of the employer to carry out his statutory duty namely to insure his com-
pensation risk, entitles the claimant, if he so chooses, to a common-law action for
full damages. W. C. L. § 11. Secondly, such failure constitutes a crime. Id. at § 52.
See People v. Donnelly, 232 N. Y. 423, 134 N. E. 332 (1922). The penalty originally
prescribed was equivalent to the pro rata premiums, but that was later abolished.
Thirdly, in all those re-6pened cases for which the statute provides for payment from
special funds (these are the cases described in §§ 25a and 123), the delinquent employer
is liable, being deprived of the benefits of those provisions. On the other hand he must,
although thus not benefitted, nevertheless contribute to all special funds. Id. at §§ 15(8)
and (9), and 25a. Fourthly, no appeal is open to him against an award reduced to
judgment unless he had deposited the amount awarded within ten days with the Com-
missioner. Id. at § 26.
14Under the California compensation act, it was held that even if the state commis-
sion were negligent in dealing with the employer's application for the privilege of self-
insurance, the persolal liability of th employer would arise. Soria v. Cowell-Portland
Cement Co., 99 Cal. App. 108, 277 Pac. 1061 (1929). Note that in California upon
failure of the employer to insure his compensation obligation, he is not only liable under
compensation law, but, in addition, under common law.. CAL. LAB. CODE (Deering, 1937)
§ 3706.
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could hold him liable as if he were an insurer, thus obviating any question of
negligence in the proceedings.' 5 Conversely, since this statutory liability
eliminates any common-law cause of action,' 6 the claimant suing the em-
ployer on account of an industrial accident before the courts is required to
plead both the failure to insure and the negligence of the employer: Other-
wise his complaint would be defective on its face and could be dismissed on
motion.' 7 A challenge to the jurisdiction of the court might be based upon
either ground. The cases which apparently held that the employer's failure
to plead the lack of a justiciable case precluded the appellate courts from
correcting that failure may clearly be distinguished on the pleadings. At
closer examination, the cases do not',refute the proposition that lack of
jurisdiction in all instances ought to be considered. Clearly, no jurisdic-
tional question even arose in those cases in which the employee's pleadings,
for example, did not suggest the industrial nathre of the accident' s or pointed
to an intervening independent cause of the injury.19 Upon such facts, of
course, no compensation claim has been established. It may, however, prop-
erly be contended that quite a different situation is presented in cases con-
cerning one of the very few types of elective insurance under New York law.
Then, the defendant must plead the election made by the employee.20
Once the employer has insured the risk, the insurance status of the em-
ployee emerges simultaneously and automatically, regardless of whether the
15Non-insured employer incurs all obligations created by statute with respect to the
insured one: See Brophy v. 'Prudential, 241 App. Div. 306, 271 N. Y. Supp. 819 (3d
Dep't 1934). As for payment to be made into special funds in absence of persons en-
titled to an award in death cases, see W. C. L. §§ 15(8) and (9), and 25a.
161d. at § 11.
17Held demurrable: Nulle v. Hardman, 185 App. Div. 351, 173 N. Y. Supp. 236
(1st Dep't 1918). See also Lindebauer v. Weiner, 94 Misc. 612, 159 N. Y. Supp. 987
(County Ct. 1916), and dictun in Thompson v. International Harvester Co., 141 Misc.
757, 253 N. Y. Supp. 190 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
1 8Thus, the lack of jurisdiction was held fatal for the action. See Scherini v.
Titanium Alloy Co., 286 N. Y. 531, 37 N. E. (2d) 237 (1941) (common-law negli-
gence action, brought on the ground that W. C. L. does not provide, for partial dis-
ability caused by silicosis, dismissed). See also Volk v. City of New York, 284 N. Y.
279, 30 N. E. (2d) 596 (1940); Nilsen v. American Bridge Co., 221 N. Y. 12, 116
N. E. 383 (1917) ; Mickel v. Althouse, 38 Cal. App. 321, 176 Pac. 51 (1918).
19 Robison v. State of New York, 263 App. Div. 240, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 388 (4th
Dep't 1942) (negligent treatment of injury suffered in employment); McDonough v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 127 N. J. L. '158, 21 A. (2d) 314 (1941) (while undergoing
hospital treatment because of an industrial accident resulting in the amputation of his
left index finger, claimant suffered a second accident which occurred when he struck
a match to light a cigarette and the alcohol dressing around his wound burst into flame,
followed by burns so severe as to require the amputation of all the remaining fingers
and thumb). See also Hull v. Hercules Powder, 20 N. J. Misc. 168, 26 A. (2d) 164
(Sup. Ct. 1942).20 See, e.g., Grimm v. Maurocordato, 191 App. Div. 550, 181 N. Y. Supp. 609 (1st
Dep't 1920).
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insurance is taken out with an insurance company or with the state fund.
Insurance under the state fund, it is true, releases the employer from any
further liability, a result not reached through an insurance contract entered
into with an insurance company.21 When a commercial company writes the
policy, the employer's liability survives, although it is restricted to compen-
sation.22  Since, however, the insurance carrier is directly liable for the
award, the employer to all practical purposes occupies the position of an
indemnitee only.2 Had he been forced to pay compensation, his right to
recover it from his insurer would not be open to any doubt, if the question
were of any practical significance at all. The employer's continuing liability
may become a reality only upon the carrier's failure to, meet his obligations.
24
Furthermore, the compensation obligation remains on the employer's hands
when there has been the mere appearance, but not the fact, of insurance cov-
erage, as in the case of the carrier's successful denial of his liability upon
the ground of the exclusion of some critical operation or location from the
coverage of the policy. A discussion of those situations will follow later.
Once the class 2 5 and the place of operations is fixed, the policy covers also
activities incident to or connected with them.
2 6
21W. C. L. § 53. Due to the special nature of the state fund (as seen from id. at
§ 76), a private act of the legislature for the relief of an individual who otherwise could
not obtain compensation would amount to an appropriation violative of the trust con-
cept underlying such funds. See, e.g., State ex rel. Trenholm v. Yelle, 174 Wash. 547,
25 P. (2d) 569 (1933) and Comment (1934) 47 HARv. L. Rev. 888.
22Also when, as in the case of the contingent liability of the contractor respecting
the employees of his subcontractor (see W. C. L. § 56), the former is released from
any liability upon the latter's insuring the risk, the decisive point lies in the insuring,
and not in the payment of compensation. As a result, that liability does not revive
in case of the insurer's bankruptcy. Sciachitano v. Forbes, Inc., 264 N. Y. 324, 190
N. E. 656 (1934).
2 3See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Moses, 287 U. S. 530, 541, 53 Sup. Ct. 231, 233 (1932).
Cf. 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Williston & Thompson, rev. ed., 1936) § 1274, p. 3638.
See also note 23 infra as to one of the practical consequences of that view of the em-
ployer-insurer relationship; and see action V of text. (Next installment. [Ed.])2 4 Naturally, the claimant may share in the assets of the insolvent insurance carrier,
which would proportionately reduce the liability of the employer. See W. C. L. § 54(1)
and Sciachitano v. Forbes, Inc., 264 N. Y. 324, 190 N. E. 656 (1934). By his payment
the employer becomes subrogated to the claimant's preferred creditor position. W. C. L.
§ 34. See In re Consolidated Indem. Ins. Co. (In re Coron), 255 App. Div. 501, 8
N. Y. S. (2d) 217 (lstDep't 1938). Obviously, before the claimant has been paid in
full, he may prove his entire claim against every one of his debtors, the bankrupt's
estate included. When the employer compromised the claim partly, the claimant still
may recover dividends from the bankrupt's estate in the full amount of his claim, not
only upon the difference, until his claim has been fully satisfied. Id.25 See Neubeck v. Doscher, 204 App. Div. 617, 199 N. Y. Supp. 203 (3d Dep't 1923)
(employer's creamery operations in X, yet not his store in Y, where he distributed the
creamery products, held to be covered). See also Barnard v. Greenberg, 264 App. Div.
£02, 35 N. Y. S. (2d) 285 (3d Dep't 1942) ; Worswick Paving Co. v. Ind. Acc. Comm'n.,
181 Cal. 550, 185 Pac. 953 (1919).2 6Winsen v. Fleischmann, 252 N. Y. 114, 169 N. E. 108 (1929).
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By this token, one becomes immediately aware of the advantage of the
ipso-jure system over its contractual counterpart with regard to the insurance-
which either type intends to provide. The defects of the latter type are in-
herent in a system the practicability of which depends, upon private trans-
actions. Does not the contractual insurance system cirry with it the propo-
sition that the execution of an insurance contract made by an insurance
carrier with the employer must necessarily precede the rise of the employee's
insurance status? Insurance has been left in the hands of insurance com-
panies and has remained contingent upon their voluntary acceptance of the
employer's application for the issuance of an insurance policy. In that re-
spect workmen's compensation insurance does not differ from other types of
insurance. Only when-the state itself conducts workmen's compensation
through state funds or other agencies is acceptance of an employer's applica-
tion made obligatory. All private insurance companies retain the freedom
to reject any such application.
There is no case in point in New York, but, regarding an analogous stat-
ute, the Texas court held that an agency created by the statute solely for
the purpose of carrying on compensation insurance canflot be held entitled to
select the risk.27 Thus, where a state fund competes with other insurance
carriers in the compensation brarich, even its insurance differs from the
insurance in states of the automatic type and from the state unemployment
insurance, as well as from federal old age insurance. The difference lies in
the juristic basis indicated by the requirement of a preceding private trans-
action for the former, and by the self-executing character of the latter. As
for insurance companies, legislative attempts made elsewhere, not in New
York, to deprive them of the right to reject an application for compensation
insurance were frustrated by the judiciary.28 A different view may be taken
of those statutory provisions in various states, devoid of state funds, by which
rejected risks are required to be distributed under pro-rata liability among
all insurance companies. So pooled together, they fulfill the function of a
27Empl. Ins. Ass'n v. U. S. Torpedo Co., 8 S. W. (2d) 266 (1928), aff'd, 26 S. W.
(2d) 1057 (1930). Note (1928) 7 TEX. L. REv. 187. That the New York Insurance
fund has to accept all risks regarded undesirable by the insurance companies seems to
be undisputed. HoBBs, op. cit. supra note 1, at 621.28Empl. Liability Assur. Corp. v. Frost, 48 Ariz. 402, 62 P. (2d) 320 (1936), in-
validating ARiz. REv. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 1422 as violative of the Four-
teenth Amendment by making it mandatory for every insurance corporation authorized
to do workmen's compensation insurance business to accept any application. For de-
tails regarding compulsory contracts, see Lenhoff, The Scope of Compulsory Contracts
Proper (1943) 43 COL. L. REv. 586.
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state fund.29 Barring such exceptions, nothing short of acceptance of the
employer's application by an insurance carrier will render the latter liable
for any accident. Accordingly, in Employer's Liability Insurance'Corp. v.
Frost,80 the court found for the insurance corporation and reversed the
award, because by the time of the accident the application was not yet ac-
cepted, although the employer had already paid the premium to the local
agent who, however, was not authorized by the insurance company to accept
that application. But since, however, the state fund must carry even un-
desirable risks under all circumstances, it is submitted that an application
made with it must be given an immediate effect, even prior to the formal
acceptance 3 1
II. TiE WORKMAN'S INSURANCE STATUS
Surely, in the first stage of the insurance relationship, as one may call
the stage reached by the employer's application and its acceptance, New
York compensation insurance seems to manifest its historical connection
with the era of. employer's liability insurance. Yet, this first stage must
not import the conclusion that the insurance status of the workman is iden-
tical with that created for him under a liability or accident insurance policy
issued to his empioyer. That an insurance relationship may arise upon
application is not enough to tag it a private insurance. Unemployment in-
surance law supplies an illustration: Nobody will deny the difference be-
tween unemployment insurance and private insurance. And yet, even there,
in some situations, coverage will require a previous application on the part
of the employer.3 2 What is the element in common that makes for placing
unemployment insurance together with old age insurance and compulsory
compensatioi insurance in a special group as to which the forensic approach
differs-from that of other insurance branches? That element lies in the cre-
ation of the worker's insurance status by operation of law and not by the
acts of the employer and the employee. As for the scope and conditions of,
or incidents to that relationship, there is no room left for the parties' ex-
pressed or implied intention. It will be shown presently that owing to that
legal mechanism, the effects of the compensation insurance occur regardless
of the employer's compliance with, or failure to perform the contractual
29E.g., MAss. ANN. LAws (Lawyer's Co-op., 1942) c. 152, § 65A-et seq.; ARK. AcTs
(1939) art. 319, § 9; Wis. STAT. (1941) § 205.30.3 OEmpl. Liability Assur. v. Frost, 48 Ariz. 402, 62 P. (2d) 320 (1936).
MSee also dictum in Texas Employer's Ins. v. Russell,. 127 Tex. 230, 91 S. W. (2d)
317 (1936), reug 61 S. W. (2d) 553 (1933).32E.g., N. Y. LABOR LAW (McKinney's Supp. 1943) § 502(3) (f) (voluntary cover-
age).
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terms agreed upon between him and the insurance carrier. The employee's
status as that of an insured arises out of and in accordance with statutory
fiat, without any regard to the employee's consent or dissent.3
As an additional element of variegation, administrative agencies in New
York and in most of the states" determine all issues incident to his insur-
ance relationship. It is not questioned that those administrative adjudications
have developed rules different from tllose of civil precedure, by Which ac-
tions of a third injured party against a liability insurer of the tortfeasor
have to be pleaded, tried, and decided. Finally, exactly as in unemployment
insurance and in old age insurance, the administrative agency has jurisdic-
tion over the carrier of workmen's compensation insurance concerning the
former's obligations to the daimant.35  From this analytical viewpoint
focussed on the described common characteristics of social insurance, one
can heartily subscribe to Mr. Justice Brandeis' statement that there is sub-
stantially no difference between the workmen's compensation insurance in
New York and that in Washington. 6 As it is there, so also here the work-
er's insurance is an indispensable part of the.compensation system.
At this point one can realize how greatly those systems embedded in, and
based upon insurance, depart from the English form of compensation founded
only upon employer's liability.3 7 The English employer may or may not
insure,38 at his pleasure.3 9 One who chooses to take out insurance may bar- .
33Farmer's Gin of Manitou Co. v; Jones, 146 Okla. 79, 293 Pac. 527 (1930).34For the very few states which, following the English pattern, adhere to court
administration of workmen's compensation law, see HOBBS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 285,
and DODD, op. cit. mtpra note 1, at 65.
35W. C. L. § 54(1) (2). Consequently, the duty to report accidents to, and to notify
the Commissioner of the assumption of payment or of their stoppage and of the inten-
tion, to controvert a claim, are incumbent upon the employer and his insurer alike. Id.
at §§ 25, 110, and Rules of the Industrial Board 5 and 6.
uJnstice Brandeis dissenting in N. Y. C. R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147, 167, 37
Sup. Ct. 546, 555 (1916).3 7WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1925, 15 & 16 GEO. V, c. 84 (principal liability of
the employer; only subordinate liability, if any, of his insurer). This rule is just oppo-
site to that of compulsory compensation insurance. See WILSON-LEVY, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION (London, 1939) 60 (on Asquith's opposition to a system of compulsory
insurance in the lengthy debates which preceded the Act of 1897) and id. at 70 (on the
satisfaction of the employers that a state-operated compulsory insurance system was
avoided). As the (London) ECONOMIST, cited there, stated as early as 1898, the whole
English system rests upon the solvency of the employer.38In case of his personal negligence, the English employer, whether or not he had
insured his obligation, remains subject to a common law liability unless complainant
elects a compensation proceeding. WLSON-LEVY, op. cit. supra note 36, at 29. That
rule is bound to show its inappropriateness progressively with every year bringing more
statutory prescriptions and, therefore, more technical breaches of statutory duties which
entitle to successful claims for damages. See, for this effect of the English Factory
Act, 1937, Hammond, The Administration of the Workmen's Compensation Act (1942)
MODERN L. Rr-v. 215.3 9However, the Union of South Africa has quite recently dropped the old system and
1943]
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gain to his liking because the courts will uphold that to which the parties
have agreed. In New York and in Washington, however, compensation in-
surance is compulsory and no longer are employer and insurance carrier
free to avoid by agreement the application of the statutory terms except for
the few instances in which the law may allow it.
It will shortly be demonstrated that the relegation of compensation insur-
ance to the same bracket as liability insurance is at striking variance with
the policy underlying the rules of law and with the realities of life. There
is more than a discernible difference between the statutory position granted
the workman and that of third parties in liability insurance. And, conse-
quently, there is a difference in the position of the parties to the insurance.
Let us examine the practical effect of that variegation.
The employer has no longer a choibe as to whether he will take out in-
surance or as to the manner of doing it. Exactly as compensation law sanc-
tions and penalizes failure to insure,40 so the same adverse consequences must
be faced in case his insurance policy would not cover his compensation lia-
bility as prescribed by statute.41 Obviotisly, but for the undesirability of his
risk, the employer might still have the freedom to choose among the avail-
able4 2 insurers.43 As for the insurance carrier, the statute prescribes the terms
under which his liability as insurer is to be defined. He cannot escape his
subjection to the administrative jurisdiction nor avoid the enforceability of
"the orders, findings, decisions or awards" against himself.44  Even if this
were all that characterizes that insurance, one could not reject the conclusion
'that to put the employee in the position to which in liability insurance the
injured third person is assigned with respect to the insurer; would be to
carry out the predilection for generalization, a very human trait, to the
point of fallacy and arbitrariness. Ordinarily, that third party stands in
has established a system of ipso jure compensation insurance, operated by a monopolistic
state fund. Act of May 5, 1941, repealing the Act of 1934, 42 INDUSTRY AND LABOUR
INF. No. 2, p. 44. It was not until 1934 that England took a step towards compulsory
insurance. The Workmen's Compensation (Coal Mines) Act, 1934, 24 & 25 GEO. V,
c. 23, declares that the employment of workmen for coal mining is a crime unless it
is done after the employer has taken out a compensation insurance policy.40See note 13 supra.
-1W. C. L. § 54(4) (clause 1). Had the claimant then chosen, nevertheless, to
pursue his claim as a statutory one, the case must be decided by the board. As for
the contrary view held by an elective statute, see Aleck's Case, 301 Mass. 403, 17
N. E. (2d) 173 (1938).42See text vupra at note 27.4The choice is restricted in twenty-four states to officially recognized private com-
panies. DODD, op. cit. supra note 1, at 513, n. 10. In other states of the non-monopolistic
state fund type, any company authorized to transact compensation insurance business
may be the insurance carrier. See e.g., N. Y. W. C. L. § 50(2).44 d. at 54(2).
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the shoes of the insured and is, therefore, subject to the insurer's defenses
against the latter.45 His status is derived from the contractual relationship
between insurer and insured and is, therefore, analogous to that of the
pledgee, assignee, or subrogatee.46 Exactly the contrary is true of the em-
ployee's position with regard to the insurance carrier. Once created, his
relationship to the insurer remains completely unaffected by any misrepre-
sentations, misstatements, breaches of warranties, or non-compliance with
conditions by the insured employer. In brief, against claims of the employee
or his dependents, the insurer cannot set up defenses based upon the em-
ployer's breach of the insurance contract, or misstatements, or other courses
of conduct before the execution of the policy or thereafter.
Accordingly, delinquencies in the payment of premiums or a breach by
the employer of any other condition can in no way prejudice the rights of
those claimants whose rights to compensation arose prior to the compliance
of the insurer with the statutory provision prescribing the form under, and
the time at which a cancellation may come into effect. This will presently
be discussed. Moreover, while elsewhere limitations of the insurance cover-
age by excepting certain perils which otherwise would be deemed to fall
within the scope of the insurance risk exempt the insurer from any liability
to third persons, 47 such exclusions, if contained in a compensation policy
would render it void just as much as any limitation in the amount.48
At this juncture, when the question is to be discussed whether any de-
fenses available to the insurer as against the insured employer are equally
available against the claimant under the statute, a new light is shed upon
the divergence of compensation insurance from the common private insur-
ance. It was one of the paramount aims of the competitive insurance type
of compensation statutes to achieve insurance coverage equal to that of
45E.g.: Coleman v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 247 N. Y. 271, 160 N. E. 367 (1928);
Rusling v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 251 N. Y. 302, 167 N. E. 450 (1929) ; General
Accident Fire & Life Assur. Co. of Perth v. Becker, 252 App. Div. 556, 300 N. Y.
Supp. 638 (1st Dep't 1937) ; Stacey v. Fidelity, 114 Ohio St. 633, 151 N. E. (2d) 718
(1926) ; Lorans v. Gethro, 228 Mass. 181, 117 N. E. 185 (1917).46Bayley v. U. S. Fidelity, 185 S. C. 169, 193 S. E. (2d) 638 (1927). The apparent
exception in favor of mortgagees under the standard mortgagee clause in fire policies
rests upon a private law conception of a contract between the latter and the insurer.
See note 81 infra; and Eddy v. London Assoc. Corp., 143 N. Y. 311, 38 N. E. 307 (1894).47For the effect of exclusion clauses in liability policies upon the injured third party,
see, Devitt v. Continental Cas. Co., 269 N. Y. 474, 199 N. E. 765 (1936). Cf. reason-
ing in Taylor v. U. S. Cas. Co., 269 N. Y. 360, 199 N. E. 620 (1936).4s"Every contract . . .absolutely void, unless it shall cover liability for the payment
... provided for [by W. C. L.J." W. C. L. § 54(4), as amended-L. of 1942, c. 617).
Thus, he who took out an invalid policy of that kind is placed on the same level as
he who did not insure his risk at all.
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exclusive state insurance by disregarding the insurer's familiar safeguards
furnishdd by the law of contracts or erected in the policy through obligations
imposed upon the insured, upon the breach of which its forfeiture was~to
follow.
It is- to be noted that the thing to be considered is not the statutory estab-
lishment of a direct action of the injured worker or his dependents against
the employer's insurer. Many a statute concerning the ordinary liability
insurance, requires the inclusion of a policy provision that supplies the in-
jured person with such a right. 49 The effect of a provision of this kind is
to give the injured claimant the same relief against the insurer to which
the insured would be entitled if he had satisfied the judgment.50 To quote
Justice Cardozo, "The cause of action is no less but also it is no greater."' 1
That is true even where, as in a very few states (not New York), the in-
jured party is givefn a direct action against the tortfeasor's insurer, without
the requirement of a previous judgment against the tortfeasor. 2 Also in the.
field of Conflict of Laws such statutes have properly been held remedial
only, ndt creating a new cause of action which could be sued on in another
jurisdiction. 53 What sets off the 'status of the worker under compensation
insurance in contrast to that of the third person is the independence of the
former's right from his employer's rights against the insurer. As statutory
law cieates the worker's rights against -the insurer, it alone defines their
measure, and specifies the requirements for their termination. 54 And courts
in a state other than that in which the industrial accident occurred have en-
forced that right to compensation provided that the forum has judicial
machinery to handle such compensation claims.55 Furthermore, the aim of
49See N. Y. Ixs. LAW § 167(b) (direct action upon the insured's failure to satisfy
the judgment within thirty days, "under the terms of the poliry or contract for the
amount of such judgment not exceeding the amount of the ...limit of coverage.").
For the uninterrupted line of cases holding under this provision that breach of clauses
(e.g., notice provision) by the insured affects the rights of the injured person against
the insurer, see the New York cases cited in Annotation (1932) 76 A. 'L. R. 17, 216
et seq.50Coleman v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 247 N. Y. 271, 275, 160 N. E. 367, 368-369
(1928).
51Ibid.52Such is the case in Wis., R. I., and La. See -infra note 53. See, e.g., Stone v. Inter-
State Exchange, 200 Wis. 585, 229 N. W. 26 (1930).53See Wells v. Am. Employers' Ins., 132 F. (2d) 316 (C. C. A. 5th, 1942); and
MacArthur v. Md. Casualty. Co., 184 Miss. 663, 186 So. 305 (1939) (both cases con-
struing the Act La. No. 55 ex. 1930). See also Oertel v. Williams, 214 Wis. 68, 251
N. W. 465 (1933) [construing Wis. STAT. (1931) § 85.93 and § 260.11].54See Judge Cardozo's opinion in Matter of Sni2Jth v. Heine Boiler Co., 224 N. Y. 9,
12, 119 N. E. 878 (1918).55Floyd v. Vicksburg Cooperage Co., 156 Miss. 567, 126 So. 395 (1930).
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that law is to secure to employees insurance coverage throughout the dura-
tion of their employment. Thus, by administrative control over the coverage,
that objective is to be achieved. An adequate control is established over the
uninterrupted coverage of the compensation risk by the statutory provision
that the cancellation of the policy cannot be given any effect as against the
employee until the formal notification to the industrial board and the ex-
piration of a period of ten days thereafter.50
The scope of this statutory rule is much wider than it appears at first
blush, for it makes all facts other than those referred to by statute inopera-
tive as against the employee.
So, the distinction between a contract which is void at the root and one
which is 6nly voidable and rescissible calls particularly for careful notice in
compensation insurance. However strongly and materially the fraud by
which the employer induced his acceptance as an insured or his unintentional
but material misstatements make for the rescission or the forfeiture, they
cannot affect the insurer's statutory obligation as against a claimant. His
claim stands, although the injury occurred subsequent to the cancellation of
the policy, yet prior to the notification to the board and the expiration of
the ten-days period.57 If the claimant's rights had to be determined by con-
tractual concepts, his right of actiop could not survive once good cause for
rescission or forfeiture had been shown by the insurer against the employer
as contracting party.58
56W. C. L. § 54(5) "No contract ... shall be cancelled .. .until at least ten days
after a notice. . ." As for the state insurance fund, § 94 as amended, Laws of N. Y.
1939 c. 668, determines that the employer may withdraw only upon compliance with § 50,
that is, by taking out insurance with another insurance carrier or by being licensed as
a self-insurer.
57Ibid. See dictum in Royal Indemnity Co. v. Heller, 256 N. Y. 322, 176 N. E. 410
(1931) and the holding in Matter of Aioss v. Sardo, 249 N. Y. 270, 164 N. E. 48
(1928) (fraudulent statements made prior to the issuance of a policy held no defense
as against the claimant). Matter of DiDonato v. Rosenberg, 256 N. Y. 412, 176 N. E.
822 (1931) (mistaken inclusion of contractor in insured business held immaterial as to
injured employee in absence of formal notification). As for other jurisdictions with
acts of a similar type, see Farmer's Gin Co. of Manitou v. Jones, 196 Okla. 79, 293 Pac.
527 (1930) and Home Petroleum v. Chipman, 106 Okla. 225, 233 Pac. 738 (1925)
(cancellation clause to operate in case of assignment or transfer of interests, held of no
avail as against claimant because of insurer's failure to file notice of cancellation in the
office of the Commission). Continental Cas. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 61 Utah 16,
210 Pac. 127 (1922) (facts sufficient to make a policy voidable only, such as fraud or
mistake, held not to authorize the denial of relief to the dependents of a worker killed
by industrial accident). Kelly v. Howard, 233 Mo. App. 474, 123 S. W. (2d) 584
(1938) (although at first glance appareptly contrary, this case in fact held that award
should be rdndered against insurer upon a policy, irrespective of the defense of fraudu-
lent procurement of the reinstatement of the policy).58See RESTATElrNT, CoNTRACTs (1932) § 140; 2 WLLmsTON, CoNTrAcTs (Rev. ed.
Williston & Thompson, 1936) § 364 A, n. 11.
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III. THE SCOPE OF THE INSURER'S DEFENSES IN THE ADmINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDING
In order to appraise fully the wisdom of the result reached by the courts
in construing the provision, one has to realize only the effects which the
opposite rule would necessarily carry with it. Had the question of coverage
to await the occurrence of an accident for authoritative answer, one might
without any stretch of imagination visualize how much that time factor
might invite the insurer's speculation. Yet, worse than that, the trick would
be played upon the innocent victim, the worker. .To limit the latter solely
to a recovery from his employer would add insult to injury, for one may
fairly evaluate the employer's probable financial-status arid the adequacy of
the recovery from the employer's conduct against his insurer.
With the view of securing compensation as safely and as promptly as pos-
sible, the law has expressly authorized the administrative agency to enforce
the compensation liability against the insurer "in the name of the people...
for the benefit of the person entitled to the compensation." 59 In a compen-
sation insurance policy there must be included a provision extending the
jurisdiction of the Board over the employer to his insurance carrier.60 The
thought behind the statute was to establish the liability of the insurer in the
same proceeding with the compensation claim. Consequently, the courts of
New York, as it will be seen later, have rejected attempts on the part of
insurince carriers to bring questions of their liability before them because
the board has the power of a court of general jurisdiction to have any
defense, equitable and non-equitable alike, litigated before, and determined
by it.6' Upon a workmen's compensation 'law of a similar type, the courts in
California have taken the same view.6 2 On the other hand, dealing with an
analogous statute, the Wisconsin and Maryland courts have denied the
industrial commission the power to pass upon equitable defenses, a holding
derived apparently from, and resulting in, the proposition that quod non
apparet [in the policy] non est.63
59W. C. L. § 54(1).60W. C. L. § 54(2). See Matter of Jaabeck v. Crane's Sons Co., 238 N. Y. 314, 317,
144 N. E. 625, 626 (1924). Where the act conditions an obligation of the insurance
carrier and of the employer upon the consent of either of them, e.g., for the-deficiency
resulting from a compromise with the third party, that provision does not apply, because
it refers to the jurisdiction of the board alone. Bekman v. Brodie, 249 N. Y. 175, 163
N. E. 298 (1928).
O1See Matter of Skoczlois v. Vinocour,, 221 N. Y. 276, 116 N. E. 1004 (1917), Royal
Indemnity Co. v. Ieller, 256 N. Y. 322, 176 N. E. 322 (1931).62Employers' Liab. Assoc. v. Ind. Acc. Comm'n, 177 Cal. 771, 141 Pac. 935 (1918),
Bankers Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Comm'n, 4 Cal. (2d) 89, 47 P. (2d) 719
(1935).63See dictum in Kelley v. Minneapolis, St. P.'& S. S. M. Ry., 206 Wis. 568, 240
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However, no matter whether the exclusion of an unnotified cancellation
from the class of available defenses is cast in one mold or the other, the
result is the same. When the cancellation. was not made formally known
to the board at the time when the accident occurred, the board has to find
against the insurer. In other words, the board will, once the fact of the
issuance of the insurance policy has been proved, refuse to give any con-
sideration to questions of fraud or misrepresentation or warranties nor to
other facts establishing forfeiture of the contractee's rights, e.g., premium
arrears. The attitude of New York and California is more in line with the
whole concept of the workmen's compensation laws which, as was discussed
above, places the employees' rights exclusively upon statutory ground. True,
the statute interlocks the coverage of the employee, at the threshold, with
that of his employer; but, that requirement having been met the continuance
of the coverage no longer depends exclusively upon that of the employer.
And, in the same way, it is not the will of the parties, but rather the law
that not only prescribes the scope of the insurer's obligation, but also deter-
mines who are the obligees. Since the enactment of the amendment of 1939,
all employees are to be deemed to be included in the coverage. 4
The result is that the insurance carrier may prove before the board that
the claimant was not an "employee" at all, or that he was not employed by
the insured, because of his having been in the employment of a third person.
Yet, a defense based upon an exclusion in the insurance policy of the claim-
ant from the scope of the coverage will no longer lie.6 5
Can the carrier raise the expiration of the policy as a defense? It has
been propounded, indeed, that the termination of a policy does not fall within
the concept of "cancellation" in the meaning of the statute,60 so that the
expiration of the specified term or the death of the employer would ipso jure
N. W. 141 (1932). The reference made therein to Wisconsin Mutual Liab. Co. v.
Ind. Comm'n, 190 Wis. 598, 209 N. W. 697 (1926) is not convincing, because the latter
case deals only with the lack of jurisdiction of the Commission in a third-party action.
In accord with the same rationale is U. S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Taylor, 132 Md. 511,
104 Atl. 171 (1918).04Prior to that amendment, L. 1939, c. 404, the contracting parties were still given
such freedom to contract as to exclude one or more employees or an entire class of them,
specifically designated, from the coverage.
65A discussion of the thorny distinction between general and' special employer would
fall beyond the scope of this paper. Likewise, the paper will not discuss the question
of the validity of an employment contract as a requisite for the insurance coverage.66See Comment (1919) 19 COL. L. REv. 79. Note, however, that statutory provisions
'following the New York lead as, e.g., Michigan, expressly refer to "any termination or
cancellation." MIcH. ComP. LAws (1929) § 8460 (f). There has never been any doubt
that failure to notify the board continues the liability after the expiration of the speci-
fied term. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Moss, 276 Mich. 219, 267 N. W. 819 (1936).
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terminate the coverage, in the latter case even though the term of the policy
had not yet expired. 67 To state that the general concept of the "personal"
nature of the insurance contract ought to prevail over the legislative pro-
nouncement, which disentangles the employee's protection from the terms
of private negotiation, is to lose sight of the very objective of compensation
insurance. The "personal-contract" theory originated in an era when in
writing policies the insurance companies were able to live unto themselves.
One may question whether this doctrine which has fitted in so nicely with
the innumerable erstwhile technical clauses in fire insurance policies, is still
justifiable even within the realm of a olely monetary valuation of insured
interests. 68 Why should an insurance company be released from its obliga-
tion when the transfer of, or the. succession to, the insured business opera-
tions does not increase the hazard of the insurer at all ?69 Is not the hazard
of the employment which is inherent in the entire operations of the insured
business the factor which determines the risk ?70 At one glance it seems to
be unquestionable that the law applies to the corporate employer with his
'practically unlimited life and with his business operations conducted by a
board of managers shifting from one job to the other just as well as to a
physical person who happens to own'a business.
Curiously enough, the insurance companies, being deprived of the possi-
bility of declaring' the policy forfeited in case of a change in the ownership
of. the shares in the stock of a corporation as well as in case of a change in
the management, were able to hold their own in that doctrine with respect
to changes in personally owned business undertakings. One may challenge
the soundness of that result all the more when one considers the freedom
of the insurance companies to reject risks held undesirable or to condition
the acceptance of an application upon the installation of special safety de-
vices. Incidentally, the statutory prescriptions in New York are adequate
67Kolb v. Brummer, 185 App. Div. 835, 137 N. Y. Supp. 72 (3d Dep't 1918), (with
Kellogg, P. J., vehemently dissenting), aff'd w. o. 226 N. Y. 570, 123 N. E. 874 (1919)(accident subsequent to the death of the employer but prior to the expiration of the
terin of the policy and to its transfer by endorsement to the former employer's wife,
who continued his business, held, not covered). But see note 72 inf ra.68The New York standard fire insurance policy, in its revised form, as of July 1,
1943, L. 1942, c. 900, eliminates the "change of interest" clause and renders the policy
no longer void in case of an assignment. See Note (1942) 42 COL. L. Ray. 1227.6 9 0r does, for instance, the transfer of the rights of the mortgagee whose interest is
protected by the mortgagee clause, increase the insurer's risk? See the clear answer
in Central Union Bank v. N. Y. Underwriters Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 5th, 1931) 52 F.(2d) 823.7'OSee, e.g., In re Madden, 222 Mass. 487, 111 N. E. 379 (1916). From the insurer's
viewpoint, the risk involved in the person of the employer relates only to his solvency,
a risk inherent in any contract.
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and severe enough to make employers install all possible safety devices.
After all, the insurance companies still may cancel the policy "at any time."
With all that in mind, one cannot find any satisfactory reason that an in-
veterate doctrine should be thrust upon and perpetuated in an insurance
field of the most recent type. And what about the construction of the statute?
Although the state fund must accept any application, the act provides that
the transfer or the assignment of his business by the employer does not
automatically terminate his insurance entered into with that fund; it might
only occasion him to cancel it.71 Were an insurance company held to be
released from its obligation because of such occurrences, the result would
run directly counter to the policy expressed in the provision just noted.
Indeed, the judicial construction as it stands today seeks to be in accord-
ance with the wisdom of the statute. Reading on the one hand in a recent
decision the sentence, "The name of the insured in the policy is not always
important if the intent to cover the risk is clear," 72 one is impressed, for
one feels that the drive away from the formalistic "personal-contract" theory
in a direction which points to the employing business rather than to its
owner, as the insured is well underway. 78 On the other hand, the courts
71W. C. L. § 94(b). See the reference to that provision in Kellogg, P. J.'s dissent
in the Kolb case, note 67 .rtpra.72Matter of Lipshitz v. Hotel Charles, 226 App. Div. 839, 234 N. Y. Supp. 513 (3rd
Dep't 1929) (Hotel Charles was the insured party but at the time of the accident it
was owned and operated by a partnership). See also Matter of Cohen v. Buccheri,
251 App. Div. 765, 295 N. Y. Supp. 515 (3rd Dep't 1937) (change in the ownership of
the business held immaterial as to the insurance coverage, although the accident oc-
curred subsequent to that change). It was in the latter case that the appellate division,
without any distinction between the state fund and other insurance carriers, indicated
that it takes a cancellation to terminate the insurance relationship. In Matter of Latour-
nerie v. Carney et al., 252 App. Div. 713, ,298 N. Y. Supp. 1001 (3rd Dep't 1937), the
insurance policy itself had provided that it should not be affected by death of the em-
ployer under continuation of the business by an executor, administrator, and so on. See
to the same effect the present so-called "standard" policy (second page, D) which, how-
ever, treats the transfer of the business inter vivos differently. ("No assignment of inter-
est . . . shall bind the company unless the consent . . . shall be endorsed hereon.")
(second page, I). This policy is also published in HoBBs, op. cit. .rupra note 1 at 662,
664. Compare the holding in the Buccheri case supra, and National Automobile Ins.
Co. v. Ind. Acc. Comm. et al., 29 Cal. App. 336, 84 P. (2d) 201 (1938). In the latte
case an award was affirmed which was rendered upon an accident concerning an
employee whcr was hired after the dissolution of the partnership during whose existence
the policy was issued.
7EAt this juncture one may realize how much more compensation insurance has in
common with all the modern social laws than with those concerning private business
relations. When a back-pay order was countered with the defense that the order lost
its force because of the dissolution of the partnership due to the intervening death of
one partner, the court answered that it is the business entity, not the members to which
the' Labor Relations Act refers, so that common law rules on the termination of a
partnership have no control. N. L. R. B. v. Colten, 105 F. (2d) 179 (C. C. A. 6th,
1939). See also with respect to other problems, Agvilines, Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 87 F.
(2d) 146, 151 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936).
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are coming to recognize that the provision by which the effect of a cancel-
lation is made to depend upon notification to the Industrial Board calls
for a wider construction. Thus, such a construction subsumes the expira-
tion of a specified term under the concept of cancellation, lest the socially
desirable objective of a continuous coverage for the employees be rendered
nugatory.7 4
Howevr, the courts espousing that concept have been careful to distin-
guish between effective transactions and ineffective attempts to procure
insurance. Naturally, invalid bargains are not open to termination, nor do
they need to be, because they never did have any effect. That can be seen
from the concealment cases, as where the applicant concealed that the acci-
dent had occurred prior to his application, and later reported the date to be
one as to which the insurance policy was conveniently antedated. Then, true,
the insurer-was not able to cancel and to notify of the cancellation. How-
ever, it is going a wrong way to place cases of the last mentioned pattern
upon the same footing as those pointing. to fraudulent representations. Since
the fact that each party has to take an unknown risk 'is essential to the
validity of an insurance contract and so constitutes its subject matter, an
application made in awareness of the occurrence of an accident cannot lead
to a 'valid policy; a policy issued under such circumstances must be held
void ab initio.75 It is the legal, impossibility of the subject of the contract
which renders the policy null and void.76
Where, however, none of the parties to the insurance contract knew of
the happening of the accident which occurred subsequent to the application
but prior to the issuance of the antedated policy, the risk was not yet deter-
mined at that time and the policy is therefore valid; erga, the insurance
carrier has been held liable to make the statutory compensation. 77 All the
74Accordingly, that provision was applied to an insurance which rested only upon a
fifteen-day binder after the expiration of which the accident occurred, no definitive con-
tract having been made as yet. Matter of Kornblatt v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 263
App. Div. 770, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 889 (3rd Dept 1941).75Matlock v. Hollis, 153 Kan. 227, 109 P. (2d) 119 (1941) (policy held void and
recovery of employee, therefore, denied against the insurance company for an injury
suffered prior to the issuance of the policy but within the term fixed therein by ante-
dating the policy, the employer having been found to have concealed the occurrence
of the injury at the time of his application). To the same effect: Lima v. Ind. Acc.
Comm'n, 1 Cal. App. (2d) 43, 36 P. (2d) 223 (1934). Cf. VAxcE oN IxsTRANcE (2d
ed. 1930) 834: "There can be no valid insurance unless there is something to insure."
A quite different view must be taken of the insurance of potential losses unknown to
either party, a common feature of marine insurance ("lost or not lost").76Scott v. Coulson, [1903] 2 Ch. 252 (insured was dead). One may just as well sub-
sume the situation as described in the text under the head of "fraud in esse," for the
effect of the antedating of the contract goes to the substance of, and not only to the
motive for making, the contract. See also 2 REST., CONTRACTS § 475, illustration 5.77Orto v. Poggioni, 245 App. Div. 782, 281 N. Y. Supp. 16 (3d Dep't 1935), aff'd
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more must this be true where the facts, at the utmost, could give rise only
to the avoidance of the contract as in case of misrepresentations. Conse-
quently, fraudulent representations inducive to the issuance of the policy
may, if material, render the contract voidable; but, until rescinded, it exists.78
To deny the liability of the insurance carrier against the worker who suf-
fered an injury prior to the rescission would frustrate the purpose of the
statute in placing the burden of the compensation risk upon the carrier.
IV. COMPENSATION INSURANCE AS PART OF SOCIAL INSURANCE
The insurance of the employer's liability risk is only one of the two ob-
jectives of the statute; the other lies in the insurance of the industrial acci-
dent risk of the employee. Accordingly, the insurance carrier stands in two
different relationships: to the employer on one hand, and to the employee
on the other.7 9 And, as noted before, the fundamental distinction between
the two lies in their structure, the former being controlled by contractual
concepts, the latter by statutory commands. The statutory structure of the
employee's insurance makes itself felt with a vengeance in the described
immunization of his position from his employer's conduct as against the
insurance carrier. Moreover, the statute lays down the rule that the em-
ployee's waiver of his rights or an arrangement between employer and the
insurance carrier to take away from, or even only to reduce, his statutory
rights has no effect at all.80
Obviously, the protection which that provision affords connotes a legis-
lative policy which bears out the conclusion reached in various ways. When
the employee's rights are declared invulnerable against transactions effected
with his consent, they cannot be interfered with by one-sided acts of the
employer or the insurance carrier of which the Board has not been notified.
271 N. Y. 551, 2 N. E. (2d) 690 (1936). For an interesting survey of cases, see Points
v. Wills, 44 N. M. 31, 97 P. (2d) 374 (1939) (the employer having made the applica-
tion for insurance to take effect on the date of the application, policy held valid upon
occurrence of the accident subsequent to that application, although prior to the issuance
of the policy). See, furthermore, General Acc. F. & L. Ins. v. Ind. Acc. Comm'n, 196
Cal. 179, 237 Pac. 33 (1925) (award upheld, provided that employer at the time of
taking out insurance was ignorant of accident which occurred a few hours earlier on
the same day).
7SEmployers' Liability Assur. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Comm'n, 177 Cal. 771, 171 Pac. -935
(1918). See for that distinction particularly, Matlock v. Hollis, 153 Kan. 227, 109 P.
(2d) 119 (1941).70The concept of the dual function of workmen's compensation, i.e. of the existence
of two distinct obligations of the insurer, has supplied guidance in various ways. See,
e.g., Points v. Wills, 44 N. M. 31, 97 P. (2d) 74 (1939) and United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Taylor, 132 Md. 511, 104 Ati. 171 (1918).
80W. C. L. § 32, 54(4).
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Naturally, that result cannot be regarded as a propriety of this branch of
insurance law. Wherever the community holds the safeguarding of a third
party's interest in an insurance to be worth protection, judicial construction
will strive to separate the latter's coverage from that of the insured. The
factor which distinguishes the status of the employee as an insured from,
say, that of a mortgagee protected by the standard mortgage clause, is the
character of his rights formed in a different matrix from that of the latter's.8
There is a more fundamental similarity between compensation insurarice
and compulsory automobile insurance, and it is no casual one, indeed, for
the basic concept of such automobile insurance follows closely the suggested
concept of compulsory compensation insurance.82 As often happens in the
process of drafting new bills, the later law took account of that which in
the practice of its model proved itself a fertile source of quibbling. In clari-
fication of the status of the protecfed person, the Massachusetts Compulsory
Motor Vehicle Liability Act has improved upon its model.8 3 The Act pro-
vides that "no act or default of the insured, either prior or subsequent to
the issue of the policy shall operate to defeat or avoid the policy so as to
bar recovery provided in the policy by. the judgment creditor."8 4 What
this field of insurance has in common with compensation insurance is the
81For various reasons the "standard" or "union" mortgagee clause in fire insurance
policies must be deemed to be of a different nature than in those insurance branches
under consideration. The mortgagee clause also gives the mortgagee a status independent
from that of the insured mortgagor. Goldstein v. Nat. Liberty Ins. Co., '256 N. Y. 26,
175 N. E. 359 (1931). But the status of the former no less than that of the latter arises
upon a contractual basis. Ibid. See also N. Y. INSuRANCE LAw c. 28, § 168(2) (d).
Furthermore, there is n statute which requires the incorporation of the clause into
the policy. Ergo, in New York the courts balk at reading that clause into the policy.
Without its incorporation into the policy, the mortgagee has no status -independent from
that of the mortgagor. Hessian Hills Country Club, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 262 N. Y.
189, 186 N. E. 439 (1933).82For historical references, see Braun, The Finaiwial Resposibility Law (1936) 3
LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 505.8 3MAss. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 90, § 34B; c. 175, § 113A.
841d. at § 113A(5). For the constitutionality of that section, see Opinion of the
Justices to the Senate and the House of Representatives, 251 Mass. 569, 147 N. E. 681
(1925). It is noteworthy that this Massachusetts automobile liability insurance law
'follows up the concepts -of the N. Y. W. C. L. also in the requirement of a previous
written notice to the other party and to the registrar for cancellation, while the Massa-
chusetts workmen's compensation law does not. There, a cancellation given by one
party to the other or agreed upon between the parties stops the insurance coverage im-
mediately, even in the absence of any communication thereof to the Board. See MAss.
GEN. LAws (1932) c. 152, § 22, and Altinovich's Case, 237 Mass. 130, 129 N. E. 372(1921). Quaere, is the reason for that divergence to be found in the fact that the
former law has been compulsory since its inception, and that the latter has not? Quite
recently by the AcTs OF 1941 c. 410, MASS. ANN. LAWS (Lawyers Co-op. 1942) c. 152,
,§ 19B, that divergence has abated somewhat on account of the provision requiring the
uninsured employer to post notice of the lack of insurance coverage in his plant.
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statutory creation of rights for the victims of accidents resulting from spe-
cific sources against the insurance carriers elected by those persons whom
the statute has burdened with the cost of the insurance. Naturally, where
the law, as in old age and survivor's insurance, in unemployment insurance
and in compensation insurance by a monopolistic state fund, has eliminated
that element of selection, the independence of the. employee's status from the
employer's mismanagement and failures has never been open to doubt.
Hence, the qualification of the employees and beneficiaries has not to be
tested by proofs either of reports or of contributions .which the employers
are under a statutory 'obligation to make.85 Moreover, neither here nor
there is the amount of benefits or compensation measured by the amount of
premiums actually paid. 86 They are more or less related to previous earn-
ings, whether or not premiums were paid, provided, of course, that at the
time when the claim accrued the employee was eligible. In the case of
workmen's compensation, eligibility rests, inter alia, upon an insurance
relationship of the employer which has not yet been rendered inoperative
within the meaning of the statute.
At this point, again, we observe that in contrast to liability, annuity, and
life insurance, the premiums in all three branches of statutory insurance
are not measured by an amount insured, but only by the amount of wages.
Furthermore, as the obligation of the insurer is not limited at all by any
amount insured, statutory provisions determine and fix the amount due,
subject to no modification whatsoever by agreements between the parties con-
cerned. Obviously, this results necessarily from the structure of compensa-
tion insurance; for, as it was noted above, the worker's status arises without
any regard given to his intention, consent, or even knowledge.8T Conse-
8 GSee for old age and survivor's insurance the SociAL SECURITY ACT OF 1939, 53 STAT.
1365 (1939), 42 U. S. C. §§ 402 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f), 409 (g) (h). As for unemploy-
ment insurance, see N. Y. LABOR LAw § 503(3), as amended L. 1942, c. 640. Certainly
the reference in the text loses any argumentative force in those countries where the statute
itself bases the qualification for old age insurance, although operated by the state, upon
the payment of contributions. See the SocIAL SECURITY ACT of New Zealand, Law of
Sept. 14, 1938, 1938 N. Z. STAT. 62, ind Stack, The Meaning of Social Security
(1941) 23 J. ComP. LEGis. (3d Ser.) 113, 114. The first old age insurance laws, such
as the German and Austrian laws, required the payment of contributions of a certain
amount for eligibility, so that the continuation of. the employment throughout the whole
period without the completion of contributions was not sufficient to establish eligibility.
As was stated clearly, these laws brought old age insurance closer to the analogous
annuity and life insurance types in that respect. See LuTz RICHTER, SOZIALvERSICH-
ERUNGSRECHT (1931) 137, and Austrian GVERBLICHES SOZIALVERSICHERUNGSGESETZ§ 250.86See Gissing v. Liverpool Corp. [1935] Ch. 1.87Naturally, in jurisdictions where it is left to the employer to elect or to refuse
coverage by the compensation act, a different approach to workmen's compensation
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quently, his rights cannot be bargained away, neither in advance of nor
after the occurrence of the injury.8 8 All this is familiar matter, common
to all three branches. Nor is there any difference between them in the re-
jection of substitutionary schemes of contractual character 9 nor in the
immunity of the claims from any reduction by counterclaims or set-offs.9 0
True, the employer who continued to pay the regular wages to his injured
employee during a disability period may in undisputed cases demand re-
imbursement out of the compensation up to the amount not yet paid. 91 How-
ever, these very qualifications mark those payments as compensation ad-
vancements.9 2 While formerly the mere fact of the payment of the wages
during the disability period led to a denial of any compensation upon the
concept of the employee's not having suffered any loss, 93 now an amendment
has brought about a change.9 4 With that removal of a reminder of the
principle inherent in liability insurance, the claimant no longer endangers
his claim by not being taken off the payroll. All the less can monies paid
insurance must be found. See Liberato et al. v. Royer & Herr, 81 Pa. Super. 402 (1923),
aff'd 281 Pa. 227 (1924).
88W. C. L. § 25(1) (cl. 8) (no closing of a case without a notice and an opportunity
for a hearing). The Board itself may compromise in case of the employer's default in
the payment due under an award. Id. at § 26. Only the Board may inaugurate a lump
sum scheme in lieu of an award in installments. Id. at § 27.
s9Under this rule, a private insurance contract for the benefit of the employees or
a retirement system, regardless of whether it is based upon contributions of both the
employer and the employees or upon the contributions of the employer only, cannot affect
the right to, or the amount of, compensation due pursuant to W. C. L. Id. at § 30.90 That result follows from the exemption of compensation from any execution. Id.
at § 33. The exemption concerns both the claim and the money already paid, e.g., as a
lump sum. It does not matter to whom the payment was due, the employee or his
dependents. For the legislative intention evidenced by the history of that provision, see
Surace v. Danna, 248 N. Y. 18, 161 N. E. 315 (1928). In Tosti v.. Sbano, 170 Misc.
828, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 321 (N. Y. City Ct. 1939), that exemption was deemed to ex-
tend to a house purchased by a judgment debtor who made a down payment with part
of the award. See also DeDonato v. Rosenberg, 221 App. Div. 624, 235 N. Y. Supp.
46 (3d Dep't 1927).
91W. C. L § 25(1) (cl. 9). The right to be credited with the advance payments
extends to the actual amount of the wage payments made and not only to that of the
compensation rate. Ott v. Greenwood Cemetery, 262 N. Y. 532, 188 N. E. 52 (1933).92That is a sequel to the principle covering the payment of compensation, for the
employer has to continue paying the periodical rates in like manner as wages without
waiting for an award, or to file in time a notice of controversy. W. C. L. § 25 (1)
(cl. 1 and 4).93Matter of Nagy v. _dwol, 234 App. Div. 903, 254 N. Y. Supp. 961 (3d Dep't
1931) ; Matter of Sullivan v. Seely, 226 App. Div. 629, 236 N. Y. Supp. 377 (3rd Dep't
1929); Matter of Rasmussen v. Park G. & M. Shop et al., 223 App. Div. 591, 229 N. Y.
Supp. 161 (3rd Dep't 1928). In the last case cited a dictum was added to the effect
that in case the injured employee, while being paid wages, should employ a helper to
be paid by him, he might "possibly" be given an award.
94L. of N. Y. 1930, c. 316. The words "payments . : . in like manner as wages" were
added to the words "advance payments of compensation," so that either payment can be
treated as credit only if the employer seasonably claims it at the Board.
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to him under a company's pension system or an accident policy taken out
by his employer abate his rights.9 5
However, the law allows the state, municipalities, and their political sub-
divisions to make deductions for benefits payable under a pension system
or under a statute, provided they are made without any contributions on
the part of the employee; such deductions are allowed only in death cases.9 6
What about payments of pensions from public funds? Public corporations,
on an ever increasing scale, provide for funds or pension systems so as to
grant their employees a right to a pension in case of their retirement in
consequence of accident, disabilities. Simultaneously, these corporations act
practically as self-insurers for their compensation risks.97 Thus, fairness and
consideration of the expenses to be passed on to the taxpayers make for an
irresistible demand for a sound solution of the conflict between the principle
of maintaining the integrity of the award and that of avoiding a duplication
of benefits. Indeed, 'New York's Civil Service Law found such an expedient
by providing for a reduction of pensions by the amount of the award. 98 As
the appellate division explained, that concept intends to avoid double pay-
ments by the employer for the same disablement.99 "
At this juncture, two important questions arise: First, whether the objects
aimed at by the various branches'00 of statutory insurance are not, at least
9 5Dodd v. The Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 247 App. Div. 831 (3d Dep't 1936). From
a plan to which he as a member contributed, claimant received $10 per week and the
company added $30 a week; held, those payments cannot be credited to the employer.
06W. C. L. § 30. Thus, barring death cases, it may happen that the claimant, when
he is paid both a retirement allowance and an unrestricted compensation, receives more
than he actually earned while in active service. See Svec v. City of N. Y., 251 App.
Div. 758, 295 N. Y. Supp. 393 (3rd Dep't 1937), and Fasce v. Auburn State Prison,
239 App. Div. 858, 263 N. Y. Supp. 1009 (3rd Dep't 1933). In other than death cases,
there is no set-off. Therefore, when a city had continued paying "home relief" to an
unemployed individual who was required to work out such relief but suffered an injury
while working, it was not allowed to set off the payments made subsequent to the acci-
dent against the payments due under an award. Matter of Maiceo v. City of Yonkers,
288 N. Y. 213 (1942).-
97W. C. L. § 50 (3a).
08N. Y. Cmvm SERvicE LAW § 67. However, that reduction concerns only the pension,
not the annuity payable from the employee's own accumulated contributions. See Matter
of Dalton v. City of Yonkers, 262 App. Div. 321, 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 42 (3rd Dep't
1941), rearg. den. 262 App. Div. 976, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 112 (3rd Dep't 1941),aff'd w. o.
287 N. Y. 49 (1942).
99Id. at 324, 29 N. Y. S. (2d) at 45.0 0 0ne aspect of multiplicity of claims out of the same accident is related, of course,
to the co-existence of forty-seven compensation laws in this country. That it is society
which in social insurance bears the burden, points also here to the very difference be-
tveen compensation insurance and private accident insurance. As to the latter the
amount of insurance payments may vary with the number of insurance policies; as to
the former, there can only be one single compensation for one accident. This view is
very well expressed in Hughey v. Ware, 34 N. M. 29, 276 Pac. 27 (1929). See also
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICTS (1934) § 403.
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partially, similar; second, if so, whether the rule espoused by the Civil,
Service Law does not imply a concept worth broadening. At first thought,
we observe that a fatal accident may establish claims in favor of the wife
and the dependent children of the decedent for death benefits under the
compensation- law as well as survivor's benefits under the Federal Social
Security Act.10 ' In case of a non-fatal accident and a subsequent employ-
ment followed by unemployment, such a duplication of benefits can hardly
be conceived. 10 2 Nevertheless, as it happened in Henry v. Ford Motor Co. 03
it might happen again. There a workman, although having been awarded
compensation for permanent total disability, was given a light job which
he lost as a result of'a lay-off. The court found that his right to compensa-
tion continued during the period of payments of unemployment benefits.'
Obviously, a total disability for his pre-injury job does not necessarily dis-
qualify a workman so as to bar his return to the labor market for a rela-
tively minor job. 105 Finally, a person eligible for insurance benefits under
the Social Security Act may become unemployed and entitled to unemploy-
ment compensation or may be injured and so qualify for workman's com-
pensation. 0 6
'
01 There is, on the one hand, no dependency requirement in W. C. L. as to claims of
a surviving wife or children under 18. On the other hand, neither does the Federal
Social Security Act, 49 STAT. 620 (1935), as amended 53 STAT. 1360 (1939), 42 U. S. C.
§§ 301-1305 (1940), qualify the eligibility with regard to family benefits for a widov
over 65 or a widow having in her care a child eligible to benefits by the dependency
factor. 53 STAT. 1360 (1939), 42 U. S. C. § 402(d) (1) and (e) (1940). Furthermore,
barring the case of the child's adoption or his support by a stranger or a step-father,
the irrebuttable presumption of his dependency upon the deceased makes any inquiry
unnecessary as to other sources of support. 42 U. S. C. § 402(c) (3) (1940).
'O2Ability to work is a requisite for eligibility to unemployment compensation. See
Comparison of State Uitemployment Compenration Laws, EMPLOYIENT SECURITY MEMO-
RANDUM No. 8 (1940) 85, and N. Y. LABOR LAW § 502 (10), as amended, Laws of N. Y.
1942, c. 640. Loss of employment on account of an industrial accident does, during the
period of disability, disqualify the worker for unemployment compensation. DOUGLAS,
SocIAl SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1939) 322.103291 Mich. 538, 289 N. W. 244 (1939).
'O4Ibid. It is noteworthy that the Michigan unemployment law, like that of thirty
other states, but unlike that of New York, disqualifies any individual for the period of
his receipt of compensation. However, that disqualification is,' in Michigan, limited
expressly to compensation for temporary disability. Thus, it could not apply to the
instant case. Other state laws have added permanent disability as a disqualifying factor.
See, e.g., TEx. ANN. IV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, Supp. 1943) art. 522lb-3 (e) (3).
'O5Although it does not turn upon the question of deductions, Harrington v. Dep't of
Labor, 9 Wash. (2d) 1, 113 P. (2d) 51& (1941), is instructive. There claimant, after
having been compensated for permarjent total disability through a lump sum settlement,
returned to employment with another employer, in whose service he became the victim of
another injury; the denial of compensation was upheld. See also Sorenson v. Dep't of
Labor, 12 Wash. (2d) 355, 121 P. (2d) 978 (1942).
lO6By Social Security Law primary and family benefits are subject to deductions for
wages of $15 and up earned monthly in services rendered by the primary beneficiary or
[Vol. 29
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Disregarding for a moment statutory regulations, one must admit that by
paying the benefits due under the appropriate act, the insurance carrier dis-
charges an obligation owed by himself and not by one of the two other
functionally different carriers. They remain liable for the payment of bene-
fits due under the laws governing them. Obviously, the former's payment
does not enrich them at all, let alone unjustly. In other words, there is no'
basis for applying the doctrine of subrogation.10 7 Undoubtedly, nothing other
than legislation is necessary to avoid the socially undesirable result of a
duplication of insurance benefits paid for the same risk, namely, the' loss
or impairment of earning power. Concerning the interrelationship between
unemployment insurance on the one side and workmen's compensation and
old age benefits on the other, something has already been done by the various
state legislatures. They have resorted to the aforementioned scheme of de-
ductions for the one class of benefits from the other.'08 However, one may
wonder whether it is advisable to extend that method of deduction so as'
to reduce compensation payments by old age and family benefits. The
former, it is true, fall within the state jurisdiction while the latter are sub-
ject to federal legislation and it must be added that they are based upon
contributions made partly by the employees themselves. Yet, the importance
of the entirety of workmen's compensation cannot be overemphasized.
Naturally, Congress could amend the Social Security Act so as to allow
by the recipient of a family benefit. 53 STAT. 1367 (1939), 42 U. S. C. § 403 (d), (e)
(1940). As one can see, workmen's compensation has no bearing upon the right to the
full benefits.
'07RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION (1937) § 162. In the states without a statutory pro-
vision by which the insurance carrier or employer is subrogated to or assigned the
rights of the injured person or his dependents against the tortfeasor, the courts have
denied a common-law subrogation. Such states are Ohio, New Hampshire, and West
Virginia. See, as an example, Merrill v. Marietta Torpedo Co., 79 W. Va. 669, 92
S. E. 112 (1917). The same considerations must obtain whenever analogous questions
arise in the field of old-age insurance.
There are some precedents abroad. Thus, in post-war Austria an attempt was made
to secure such statutory recovery for all branches of statutory insurance. See GEWER-
BLIcHEs SOZIALVERSIcHERUNGSGESErZ, B. G. B. (1938) No. 1, § 73. In America, in the
short time of its operation, the old age insurance law has not yet occasioned disburse-
ments of such dimensions as to invite the problem of recovery actions against tortfeasors.
Naturally, without a statutory provision to that effect; the Social Security Board has
no right of recovery against the murderer of a~relatively young worker in good physical
condition who reasonably could have been expected to live for another thirty years.
Needless to say, even a statutory recovery could under no circumstances include the
present value of benefits which would have been payable with the expiration of his life
expectancy, as computed on an actuarial basis.
108Unemployment benefits are subject to deductions for workmen's compensation in
twenty-nine states, and for old age and survivor's benefits in thirty-one states. See
Comparison, cited supra note 102, at 106, and TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN (Vernon, Supp.
1939) tit. 83, art. 5221b-3 (e) (2) and (3). -
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for a suspension of its benefits pending compensation payments. That would,
of course, necessitate the attachment of a condition pursuant to which that
suspension would not take place where the compensation is subject to deduc-
tions for those old age benefits by virtue of state legislation. With the
increasing number of old age and survivor's insurance beneficiaries in the
years to come and with the growing necessity for economizing the disburse-
ments in the post-war world, some legislation of this kind is to be expected. 10 9
That result, like the others found in the course of our discussion, fits very
well into the whole structure of compensation insurance, which the Connecti-
cut highest court properly classified as a "peculiar type of insurance."'110
It is peculiar even where, as in New York, the insurance status of the em-
ployees does not arise automatically. There, the employees have no more
private rights of action to enforce the obligation to insure than in Washing-
ton, for the obligation is a public one."'. The fact that the statute supplies
the workers also with some means of control over the employer's compliance
with his obligation must certainly be held consonant with its nature. The
New York act enables the employee to control his coverage by requiring the
employer to post and to maintain in a conspicuous place typewritten or
printed notices concerning his insurance and his statutory rights.1 12
Such control is a common feature of social insurance law. The Social
Security Act requires the employer periodically to furnish each employee
109 Compulsory compensation insurance against sickness has been rudimentary in Amer-
ica so far, Rhode Island's Acts of 1942, c. 1200 being the only exception. Where abroad
such legislation met compensation insurance, the appropriate interconnection between
the two classes of statutory insurance had to be established, for there is not only an
identity of the contingencies to a great extent, but also an identjty of the relief granted.
How statute law can dovetail the effects of one insurance with those of the other can
be seen from the German REICHSVERSICHERUNGSORDNUNG § 559, and Austrian GEWER-
BLICHES SOZIALVERSICHERUNGSGESErZ (1938) § 178.
110 Piscitello v. Boscarello, 113 Conn. 128, 130, 154 Atl. 168, 169-170 (1931).
"'11Here again one is impressed with the analogous approach in other fields of social
law, e.g., labor relations law. See, for instance, Amalgamated Workers v. Cons. Edison,
309 U. S. 261, 60 Sup. Ct. 561 (1940).
112W. C. L. § 13a (2) and § 51. The form (size) which must not be reduced with-
out the Commissioner's consent is prescribed by him. Form C-105; RULES OF THE
COmmISSioNER, Rule 20. As to the consequences an incorrect notice may have, see
Warney v. Board, 290 N. Y. 329, 49 N. E. (2d) 466 (1943). Furthermore, pursuant
to other provisions, the Commissioner may, upon notice of cancellation by the last 'in-
surer, initiate an investigation of the coverage of the compensation risk with a new
insurer. W. C. L. § 111. By California law, the failure of the employer for a period
of ten days to furnish a verified statement showing such coverage establishes a prima
facie case of failure to insure. CAL. LABOR CODE (Deering, 1937) § 3711. According
to N. Y. W. C. L. § 52(3) such a prima facie case can be made out only "in any
prosecution" for violation of the insurance obligation. In July, 1942 alone there were
for failure to insure 200 criminal convictions secured in New York City. (1942) 32
Am. LAB. LEG. Rxv. 127.
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with a written statement regarding the amount of wages paid to him." 3
True, there the coverage is independent of the employer's compliance with
his obligation to make contributions for himself and to make appropriate
deductions from the wages for the premiums owed by the employees.
1 14
However, the follow-up of this branch of insurance shows the significance of
a check-up by the employee as to whether his employer had complied vith
his obligation of making contributions, and as to whether his wage reports
were correct. Besides the right to be furnished with periodic wage state-
ments, each wage earner, and after his death his dependents, have the rightl"
to request from the Bureau of Old Age and Survivors Insurance a report
of his earnings as noted in the wage records of the Bureau, records pri-
marily based upon the employer's statements.116 However, there is a time
limit for the exercise of that right. Such an inquiry must be made not later
than sixty days after the expiration of four years following the year of the
payment. 11 7 With the expiration of that period, the records of the Board
constitute conclusive evidence of the amount of the wages as far as insurance
rights are concerned." 8  Thus, lack of vigilance may amount to a virtual
destruction of claims. Yet, even if the claimant were to receive something,
113NIT. REv. CODE § 1403(a). The statement must be furnished not later than the
second day of the first calendar month following the period covered by the statement,
the longest period being not in excess of four calendar quarters.
1141d. at §§ 1400, 1401 (a) (b), 1410.
11542 U. S. C. § 405(c) (i) (1940) ; 5 FED. REG. 1866 (1940), 20 C. F. R. § 403.703
(Supp. 1940).11 6 See Monograph No. 16 (Soc. Sec. Bd.) on Administrative Procedure, REP. ATr'y
GEN's. Comm'N (1940) 6.
"1Id. at 8; 42 U. S. C. § 405 (c).
11842 U. S. C. § 405 (c) (1) (2), and 20 C. F R. § 403.702 (a) (Supp. 1940). Owing
to the short time of its existence, the construction of the statute lacks the guide-posts
of judicial decisions. There has been no case as yet reported concerning an insured's
action for damages against an employer which is based on failure to make contributions,
or on false reports made to the authorities. Such action would put the delinquent
employer in the place of the insurer, just as is done by the W. C. L. Where, as in
Texas, in absence of compulsory insurance workmen's compensation protection depends
upon consent, the courts, nevertheless, once that protection has been secured, hold the
employer liable as if he were the insurer when he had failed to give the statutorily
required notice of the termination of the insurance. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. (Vernon,
1941) tit. 130, dirt. 8306, § 3c. See Anderson-Berney Realty Co. v. Soria, 123 Tex. 100,
67 S. W. (2d) 222 (1933). Reverting again to old age insurance, we cannot ignore
the fact that tax returns available still later, even after the expiration of the four years,
can enable the bureau to conform its records with the actual figures and may prevent
the forfeiture of the insured's quarters of coverage. See 20 C. F. R. § 403.703 (b)
(Supp. 1940). It remains to be seen whether the reckless, nay intentional, failure of
the employer to report at all or to make current reports will, in a civil action, be deemed
to make up for the claimant's lack of vigilance. Abroad, many jurisdictions have recog-
nized the claimant's right to damages; some countries formulated a statutory provision
to that effect. See, e.g., Austrian GEWERBLICHES SOZIALVERSICHERUJNGSGESETZ § 75.
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the taxes not being turned over by the employer would still lead to a deduc-
tion to be made from the benefits to which he'is entitled.,19
l19 There are provisions in the W. C. L. by which obligations are thrust upon the
employee after the occurrence of the contingency insured against. For instance, there
are the obligations to give notice of an accident or a disability, to make a request for
medical treatment under certain circumstances, to submit to a medical examination, and to
report the commencement of an action against a third party. W. C. L. §§ _13(b), 13a
(4), 18, 29(1), and 45. See also Dorfman v. Levine, 260 N. Y. 665, 184 N. E. 137
(1932). Of similar nature are the obligations imposed upon claimants under the two
other public insurance laws. They concern periodical reporting concerning the con-
tinuance of the claimant's unemployment and reporting of certain events by the bene-
ficiary of the old age and survivor's statute. N. Y. L~AoR LAW §§ 503(3)'(b) and
510(2) on one side, and Soc. SEc. AcT § 2 03(g) on the other. Yet failure to perform
those obligations need only affect a quantum of the claim. It does not cause the
coverage to be forfeited. In other words, such failure does not affect the status of being
insured and can, therefore, remain outside our discussion.
